This study determines tim flight frequencies on an airline network in response to anticipated airline competitive interactions using fuzzy logic. It is expressed as an optimization problem to be solved in the medium-term airline network-planning phase, and it deals with tactical decisions made one season or one year in advance. The proposed model includes three submodels~n airline market share model, a flight-fl'equency programming model, and a fuzzy-logic-based competitive interaction model. Flight frequencies on an airline network with competitive interactions are analyzed by combining these three submodels. A case study, demonstrating the feasibility of applying the proposed model, confirms that the competitive interactions will converge. The results of this study confirm the accuracy of the proposed model and their flexibility of the decision-making involved in determining flight frequencies on an airline network in competitive and uncertain environments.
medium-term airline network-planning phase and it deals with tactical decisions made one season or one year in advance. The model consists of three submodels, including an airline flight frequency programming mode, a market share model, and a fuzzy-logic-based competitive interaction model. The flight frequency programming model determines flight frequencies and basic airfares on individual routes of an airline network, by maximizing the airline's total profit. The airline market share model formulates airline market shares for all OD-pairs of a network as functions of flight frequency shares and relative airline airfares. The airline competitive interaction model, based on fuzzy-logic, describes the competitive frequeney/airfare interactions between two competing airlines. Then, an algorithm consisting of an iterative scheme that integrates these three submodels is presented to solve this problem. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the proposed airline market share model and flight frequency programming model. Section 3 develops the fuzzy-logic-based competitive interaction model, and proposes an iterative algorithm to solve it. Section 4 discusses a case study that demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed model. Concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
MODEL FORMULATION
The model developed herein is a profit-maximizing flight frequency programming for an airline network. It aims to determine the optimal flight frequencies and basic airfares on individual routes of an object airline's network in response to competitive interactions in individual ODpair markets well in advance. Figure 1 shows the inputs and outputs of each submodel and the connections between them. Airline market shares are expressed as functions of flight frequency shares and airline airfares in OD markets. The OD market demand and airline market shares are input parameters to the airline flight frequency programming model. Changes made by the object airline to route flight frequencies and/or airfares will trigger competitive interaction among all competing airlines in individual OD markets, affecting the airlines' market shares. 
Airline Market Share Model
Many studies have demonstrated that the relationship between airline market share and flight frequency share is nonlinear, and is normally described by an S-shaped curve [16, 24, 25] . The airline market share depends not only on the flight frequency share but also on the airfares. Moreover, the attractiveness of a given airline in an OD-pair market will depend on both its airfare and the average airfare offered by competitors.
The object airline's flight frequency share, FS°~, between OD pair r -s, is, where tp~,p is the basic airfare of the object airline on its route p between OD pair r -s, and fop is the passenger traffic carried by the object airline on its route p between OD pair r -s.
Similarly, tpX~ is the average basic airfare on OD-pair r -s for competing airline x (x ~ 0); then, the average value of tp~, for all airlines x (V x ¢ 0), tp:~, can be calculated. For simplicity, the market share formulation is regarded as an aggregate model associated with OD markets, rather than disaggregate discrete choice model based on passengers' airline and flight choice behavior. A muRiplicative model of the object airline's market share for passenger demand in an OD market can be expressed as,
where MS°~ is the object airline's market share of passengers who travel between OD pair r -s, and the superscript '0' refers to the object airline; FS°rs represents the object airline's flight frequency share between OD pair r -s; tp°s represents the object airline's average basic airfare, weighted by route traffic, between OD pair r -s, and tp:~ is the average airfare for all competing airlines x, Vx ¢ 0, parameters 70, al, a2, and a3 are estimated by regression analysis. A similar multiplicative form of the market share model was considered in [25] . Notably, given a multiplicative market share model, az, a2, and a3 are the elasticity of the airline market share with respect to frequency share, average airfare and the average airfare for all competitors, respectively. Intuitively, az and a3 would be expected to be positive and a2 to be negative.
Flight Frequency Programming Model
This section outlines the flight frequency programming model proposed in [3, 23] . Consider the object airline network, G(N, A), where N and A represent, respectively, the set of nodes and set of links in graph G. Let R (R _C N) represent the set of origin cities, and S (S C N) represent the set of destination cities in graph G, where R N S ~ ~. Any given OD pair r -s is connected by a set of routes P,s (r c R, s E S) through the network. An airline fleet that serves international routes typically includes several aircraft of various sizes. Consequently, the main decision variables in modeling the airline network are the flight frequencies on individual routes served by type of aircraft in the object airline network [2, 3] . Let N°spq represent the flight frequency of the object airline's (airline '0') type q aircraft between OD pair r -s along route p (p E P,~). Restated, if NT°~p represents the total flight frequencies of all aircraft used by the object airline on its route p between OD pair r -s, then N°~p = ~q N°~pq, and the total flight frequency served by the object airline between OD pair r -s, N°rs, is N°s --~-]p N°sp.
Let N°aq represent the flight frequency served by the object airline's type q aircraft on link a(a C A). It is the sum of the flight frequencies of all object airline's routes that contain link a, served by aircraft q. That is, N°q = ~ E (~ra:;,qX°rspq ' (4) r,s p where •a,p,qr' S is an indicator variable, given by 5a,p,qr,S : { 0,1' ifotherwise.link arm is part of route p served by type q aircraft from city r to city s; Airline Flight Frequency Determination
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The total flight frequency on link a of the object airline, N °, can now be expressed as N ° = •q N~°q = ~q >-~r,, ~p -a, p, q-a~' N°, r,pq. Let ]o represent the link flow of link a; fo is the sum of the flows on all routes of the object airline's network that pass through that link:
where 5~,~ is the indicator variable, and, f I, if link a is part of route p from city r to city s, 0, otherwise.
In airline network modeling, two-way OD passenger flows are assumed to be symmetric, an assumption made in practice by most airlines when designing their networks. A similar assumption was also made in [I-3] . Let Frs represent the total expected OD demand (market size) between OD pair r -s during a particular study period; f~o represents the total number of passengers carried by the object airline between OD pair r -s. It can be estimated as f~o __ FrsMS0rs, where MS°~ is the object airline's market share of passengers who travel between OD pair r -s, and can be obtained using equation (3) . Moreover, the following condition must be satisfied such that the total number of passengers carried by the object airline on individual routes between OD pair r -s equals the total number of passengers who travel between OD pair r -s, carried by the object airline: Ep fr°p = fr ° = Fr~MS°~ • Airline operating costs are typically divided into direct and indirect operating costs. Direct operating costs are those expenses associated with a type of operated aircraft, including all flying costs, all maintenance, and all aircraft depreciation expenses. Indirect operating costs are those expenses related to passengers rather than aircraft. Let C~" represent the total airline operating costs for link a, such as, 
q where da is the stage length of link a in miles; c~q and j3q are parameters specific to type q aircraft;
ch is the unit handling cost per passenger in U.S. dollars; nq is the number of available seats on N o type q aircraft, and la is the specified load factor associated with link a. If N ° = ~q aq =0, then C T --0.
The flight frequency programming probiem is typically considered apart from short-run yield management issues during the global airline network planning phase. For simplicity, yield management issues are beyond the scope of this study, and airfare setting is assumed to involve only determining basic airfares. The basic airfare is the backbone of the airfare structure, in that it applies to all passengers at all times and is the basis for all other airfare levels [5] . This study assumes that the object airline selects basic route airfares at or above average operating costs on every route. Lederer [26] made a similar assumption, and stated that it reflects expected behavior 0 on routes served by an airline. The basic airfare, tpr~p , per passenger on route p can then be determined as,
q where ~op is the profit margin specified by the object airline on route p between OD pair r -s. The total revenue of the object airline can then be expressed as ~,~ ~p tp~,pf},p.° 0 The flight frequency programming for the object airline network determined by maximizing its total profit 7r0 can then be modeled as,
-a,p,q-" rspq,
Equation (10a) is the objective function that maximizes the total profit rr0 of the object airline network. Equation (10b) states that the numbers of seats available for each link must be equal to or greater than the total number of passengers on all routes that include that link. Equation (10c) indicates that the total number of passengers carried by the object airline on any route p between OD pair r -s must equal the total number of passengers who travel between the OD pair and are carried by the object airline. Equation (10d) defines the relationship between link frequency and route frequency. Equation (10e) states that total aircraft utilization must be equal to or less than the maximum possible utilization, where t°q is the block time for the 0 is the maximum possible utilization, and U ° is the object airline's type q aircraft on link a; Uq total number of type q aircraft in the object airline's fleet. Finally, equation (10f) constrains all variables as nonnegative.
As stated above, the decision-makers may specify a profitable load factor la, for all links when determining the flight frequencies on an airline network. A minimum load factor,/_~, must be met on flights for link a. At this load factor, the revenue is at the minimum tolerable. A maximum acceptable load factor, la, at which a minimally acceptable level of service can be maintained for passengers is also assumed. Then, the load factor la must be specified within the interval [l~, l~], Va C A. In competitive interactions, airlines are assumed to be able to adjust their proposed flight frequencies and basic airfares by specifying different load factors la (l~ [/_~,~], Va), while maintaining demand constraints and overall objectives, in response to competitors' changing frequencies or airfares.
AIRLINE COMPETITIVE INTERACTION MODEL
In this study, the interaction model is assumed to describe simplistic competitive interactions, in which the aMine competition focuses on the changes in the flight frequencies among competing airlines rather than on price competition. Since decisions regarding pricing strategies can be made in a short time-frame, whereas those regarding changes in flight frequency may involve a longer time horizon. Accordingly, this study assumes that the setting of airfares involves only determining basic airfares, rather than decisions concerning pricing strategies during the determination of flight-frequency. Knowledge of competitors' strategic choices is usually uncertain because of the incomplete information about the competitive interactions among the flight frequency and alrfare decisions of competing airlines [9] . When an airline attempts to estimate its competitors' reactions to its strategies in the network planning stage, it can only guess at possible dispositions and the approximate range of its competitors' likely changes to frequencies and airfares. Fuzziness is introduced to accommodate incomplete knowledge about competitive interactions among airlines. Herein, fuzzy rules are applied to develop a competitive interaction model that describes competitive flight frequency and airfare interactions between competing airlines in individual OD markets. The market shares of an object airline and its competitors, and changes to the object airline's flight frequencies and airfares are the inputs of the fuzzy logic system, which approximates the reasoning that underlies competitors' reactions. The system outputs are changes in the flight frequencies and airfares of the competitors.
An object airline can characterize the reactions of its competitors, in terms of market shares and changes in flight frequencies and airfares, as fuzzy sets. Airline market shares, MS°s and MS~, Vx, Vr, s, can be grouped in three fuzzy sets, {Small, Medium, and Large}. Changes in airline flight frequency and basic airfare are assumed to vary in seven terms, {NB, NM, NS, ZO, PS, PM, PB}, where NB represents the fuzzy set "negative big"; NM denotes "negative medium"; NS denotes "negative small"; ZO denotes "near zero"; PS denotes "positive small"; PM denotes "positive medium", and PB denotes "positive big". Figure 2 presents the membership functions of the above fuzzy sets for airline market shares and changes in flight frequencies and airfares. A priori analysis of airline competition is applied to develop a fuzzy logic system, to select the fuzzy rules. This a priori analysis may include studying relevant theory (including oligopolistic competition issues and game theory), actual or simulated practice, case studies or other sorts of examples, experiments on competitive behaviors of airlines, and other specific issues involving airline competition. In developing the fuzzy rules, this study applies the concepts of airline competitive interactions developed by [9] using reaction diagrams, and follows the findings of numerical results in [9, 11] .
Consider that in a competitive flight frequency interaction between any two airlines, an increase in the object airline's frequency initially stimulates the competitor to increase its flight frequencies to maintain market share. In contrast, when the object airline's flight frequency decreases, the competitor will not lose market share without decreasing its flight frequencies. If the object airline does not change its flight frequencies while its market share also remains unchanged, then the competitor also will not change its flight frequencies. Similar statements on competitive interactions between determinations of flight frequencies proposed by any two airlines were made in [9] . However, the competitive interactions between the basic airfare settings of any two airlines are more complex than frequency competition, since basic airfare setting of a profit-maximizing airline depends upon its determination of flight frequencies. Pels et al. [II] provided evidence that an airline can increase its airfares without immediately losing market share when competitors' frequencies decrease. From the statements in [11] , if the object airline's frequency increases and its airfares decrease, the competitor will not only increases flight frequencies but will also reduce its airfares. As mentioned previously, the fuzzy-logic model determines changes in the flight frequencies and airfares of all competing airlines within acceptable ranges, in which profits are maintained. Accordingly, when airlines increase their frequencies, such that their costs also increase, they can decrease their airfares only when the increased demand allows the increase in revenues to offset the increase in costs. When the object airline increases its flight frequencies and airfares, the competitor may not change its airfares. However, if the object airline does not increase its frequency, or even reduces it, then when it increases airfares, its competitors can increase their airfares without losing market share, and will thereby increase profits. When the object airline reduces its airfares, while reducing frequency, competitors can reduce their airfares only when the object airline's airfare decreases markedly, such that the decline affects their market shares.
Furthermore, consider the competitive interaction between any two airlines, if an airline has stronger feed traffic availability than its competitor, then the changes made by the weaker competitor in its flight frequencies and airfare will be larger than those of the stronger airline, to prevent it from being forced out of the market. The asymmetries in competitive interaction due to differences in the amounts of feed traffic available to airlines were addressed in [9] . Specifically, a "stronger" airline is one with a greater market share. The above assumption was deduced from statements by [9] . It is justified since, as the weaker competitor increases frequencies and/or decreases airfares to enhance its market share, the stronger airline can dominate the market by making lesser increases in frequencies and/or smaller decreases in airfares. In contrast, when stronger airline increases its frequencies slightly and/or decreases its airfares slightly, the weaker competitor must greatly increase its frequencies and/or greatly reduce its airfares to maintain market share.
Based on the above descriptions concerning the general behaviors of competitive interactions between airlines, an approximate reasoning algorithm, consisting of fuzzy IF-THEN rules, was established to estimate competitors' reactions in terms of changes in flight frequencies and airfares. Defuzzified outputs are competitors' changed flight frequencies, AN~, and airfares, Atp~ s. In this study, defuzzification is the centroid of the area determined by the joint membership function of the fuzzy action. This center-of-gravity (COG) method is often employed in the literature [17, 27] . In the i-th round of interaction, the changes to competitor xs flight frequencies, AN~ x/, and to its basic airfares, zi Atprs, can be determined by applying the approximate reasoning algorithm and defuzzification method. Then, competitor as flight frequencies and basic airfares between OD pair r-s after i rounds of interaction, N~x~ and ~i and tp~ = (1 + AtP~s)tp~ s , respectively. All other variables, such as yield, sales promotions, and other quality variables, concerning the object airline and any competitors in its market, are assumed to be fixed in the frequency and airfare competitive interaction model. With reference to other issues concerning competition among airlines, for example involving the domestic market, competitive responses to newly entering carriers, and other types of strategy, the fuzzy logic system of the presented model can be reconstructed by applying a specific theoretical work or examining case studies, examples, and the results of experiments. In future applications, actual airline practices and policies can also be integrated into the fuzzy logic system.
In this study, once the object airline's market shares are assessed to have converged for all OD pairs, the demand-supply interaction has converged. Changes of airline market shares for individual OD pairs are determined after each round to assess the convergence conditions of the competitive interaction problem. Based on the definition of [9] , the relative change in airline market share of MS°~, is,
where RC(MS° ) represents the relative change in MS°~, and MS°~ is the value of MS°s after i rounds. Finally, the following heuristic algorithm, consisting of an iterative scheme, is proposed to solve airline flight frequency programming problems with competitive interactions among competing airlines. 
CASE STUDY
This section presents a case study that demonstrates the application of the proposed models. In this case study, the object airline is China Airlines (CI) of Taiwan, and the proposed models were applied to a simplified version of CI's international network. For simplicity, only ten cities (in eight countries) of 32 cities currently served by CI were selected, and 14 wide-body aircraft, including eight Boeing 747-4008 (394 seats) and six Airbus 300s (268 seats) were assumed to serve these ten cities. The selected nine OD-pairs were Taipei (TPE)-Hong Kong (HKG), Tokyo (TYO), Bangkok (BKK), Singapore (SIN), Kuala Lumpur (KUL), Los angeles (LAX), San Francisco (SFO), New York (NYC), and Amsterdam (AMS). Traffic between these selected OD-pairs represents about 70% of the total CI traffic. In this case study, the route flight frequencies and basic airfares of CI's network in year 2000 were used as the initial flight frequencies and airfares in the model. The study aims to determine CI's route flight frequencies under competitive interactions in the planning year 2001, not only to demonstrate the application of the proposed model, but also to compare the results of the model with the true situation. Base values for the cost-functionrelated parameters are given to solve the flight frequency programming problem for CI's network. However, some of CI's operating cost data were unavailable, so operating cost data reported in [28] was used to estimate these costs. Characteristics of the aircraft were taken from CI's fleet fact sheet and those reported by [29] , and were used to estimate block times.
Before other parts of the models, the statistical estimates pertaining to the market share model are first discussed. Monthly data from 1999 to 2000 [30, 31] , including OD passenger demands, passenger traffic by airline, airline flight frequencies and average airfares for all OD pairs, were used. For each OD market, data concerning CI's market share, total number of passengers, CI's frequency share, and average airfares of competing airlines were available for each of the 24 months Table 1 . Results estimated using the market share models on individual OD-pairs of CI's network. of the study period. Table 1 lists the estimated results obtained using the market share models of the nine OD-pairs of CI's network. Table 1 reveals that the signs of the estimated parameters, ~/0, al, a2, and a3, are as expected. The estimated models closely fitted the historical data, with strong statistical significance. The adjusted R 2 values range from 0.76 to 0.98. In seven out of nine OD markets, adjusted R ~ exceeds 0.92. F-statistics range from 24.6 to 401.8, indicating strongly significant estimated regressions. Moreover, the t-statistics associated with each of the Table 2 . Initial values of flight fi'equencies and basic airfares for all competing airlines, and market demands on individual OD pairs. estimated 7o, al, a2, and a3 are also significant. Table 2 shows that the estimated elasticity of the frequency share varies from about 0.7 to 0.95, and the estimates reflect a relatively inelastic response of market share to fi'equency share. Similar findings were reported in [25] , and the same results were analytically obtained in [11] . According to the model estimation results, the direct airfare elasticity ranges from about -6.66 to -1.01, while the cross elasticity of airfare ranges from about 2.44 to 6.75. Therefore, the relationship between airline market share and airline airfare is elastic. Moreover, the direct and cross elasticities of airfare seem to be large, because about 65% to 78% of all passengers are nonbusiness travelers in these selected markets. Similar ranges were presented in [25] .
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In this case study, actual total passenger demands between each OD pair in 2001 were taken as the OD market sizes, Fr~, Vr, s. The market sizes for OD pairs in future planning years Airline Flight Frequency Determination can be predicted by applying the forecasting model presented in the authors' earlier work [2, 32] .
The market shares of all competing airlines in year 2000 were used as initial market share levels in determining their initial flight frequencies, N~p, and basic airfares, tp~p, Vr, s,p, Vx 7~ O, corresponding to OD passenger demands in year 2001. Table 2 lists the initial values of N°spq and 0 x x -tpr~p, Vr, s,p, q, and N~p and tpr~p, Vx 7~ 0, Vr, s,p. The value rOB = 0.15 was also assumed, based upon slight adjustments in the average ratio of the actual route airfare to the average operating cost per available seat, for all routes in CI's network. In determining flight frequencies, the load factors were set to 75% for all routes on CI's network. LINGO was used to run the IP-based flight frequency programming, and the fuzzy-logic-toolbox of MATLAB was used to run the fuzzy-logic-based competition model. The competitive interaction problems were then solved using the proposed algorithm, in which stop criteria of RC(MS°s) < 0.001, Vr, s, were set. The competitive interactions that determine the flight frequencies of the object airline network converged after six rounds. Table 3 lists the related determined route flight frequencies, airfares and market shares, objective function values, and estimated competitors' flight frequencies and airfare changes are listed round by round. Table 3c also lists the measured relative changes in airlines' market shares, RC (MS°s), in each round. Table 3 shows that the competitive interactions on most routes converged soon after three or four rounds, except on route TPE-HKCI. Moreover, model sensitivities were examined by setting the load factors to 70% and 80% without relaxing the initial assumptions. When determining flight frequencies on CI's network with 70% and 80% load factors, the competitive interactions converged after eight rounds, since convergence occurred on route TPE-TYO reached in the eighth round. The competitive interactions on routes TPE-HKG and -BKK converged after six rounds, while for other routes, the convergence of competitive interactions was also reached soon after three or four rounds. Figure 3 depicts the competitive interactions of flight frequencies between the object airline (CI) and its main competitor (CX) on route TPE-HKG. Table 3 and Fig. 3 show that the determined flight frequencies increased and the airfares decreased from the initial round to the first round on route TPE-HKG, such that the competing airlines were prompted to increase their flight frequencies and reduce their airfares as determined by the fuzzy-logic-based competitive model. Only after six rounds did the market share on route TPE-HKG remain constant. Moreover, on route TPE-TYO, CI's determined flight frequencies first increased from the initial round to the first round, and then also caused competitors to increase their flight frequencies. However, the competing airlines did not change their airfares when CI increased its airfares. In this situation, CI's market shares slightly increased on route TPE-TYO from the first round to the second round. CI's market share on route TPE-TYO started decreasing from the third round because of reductions in competitors' airfares, and did not change until convergence. Table 4 lists the outputs of the flight frequency programming model with different load factors (70%, 75~ and 80%) in the competitive convergent state. The table also lists the corresponding route market shares. For comparison, Table 4 provides CI's actual flight frequencies and market shares by routes in 2001. Table 4 reveals that the route market shares for these three cases are similar to each other in the competitive convergent state. Perhaps, therefore, the competitive interaction did converge. From Table 4 , higher load factors lead to the airlines' determining lower flight frequencies of larger aircraft, perhaps reducing operating costs and realizing higher profits. However, the determined flight frequencies and airfares for the routes in these three cases are also similar to those determined in the competitive convergent state. In the competitive convergent state for year 2001, the converged market share results were accurate and the flight frequencies and airfares for each route obtained from the proposed models were reasonable, as determined by comparing them with CI's actual market shares and route flight frequencies in 2001.
As stated, many studies (e.g., [12, 23] ) have modeled airline frequency competition using the best-response approach. Hence, the results of the presented fuzzy-logic-based model were compared with those of the best-response approach, tested on the same dataset. Table 5 lists the flight frequencies and market shares obtained from the proposed model and the best-response model, respectively, in the convergent state for the year 2001. The convergence condition was reached after eight rounds in solving the best-response model. However, solving the best-response game took much longer than solving the presented interaction model. In this case study, the proposed model took 5.7 minutes, whereas the best-response approach with the same dataset took 47.25 minutes to reach convergence (using the same Pentium-4 2.4 GHz PC). The best-response approach needs to solve various network programming models for all competitors simultaneously in each round. In contrast, the fuzzy-logic-based competitive interaction model incorporates a rule-based IF-THEN approach to solving a flight fl'equency programming problem, rather than attempting in each round to solve network programming models for all competitors. Therefore, the proposed model is not NP-hard, nor does its complexity increase exponentially with the number of competitors. Moreover, Table 5 shows that the flight frequency and the market share results of the proposed model are more accurate than those of the best-response model. However, both final solutions under the convergence condition seem to be similar to the initial values. These results imply that CI is in fact currently maximizing profitability in an approximately optimal manner under conditions of converging competitive interaction.
This ease study demonstrates how anticipated competitive interactions can be considered well in advance of when solving airline flight frequency programming problems under uncertain competitive conditions. The fuzzy-logic-based competitive interaction model, incorporating theoretical airline competitive concepts, can be a useful tool with which to identify iteratively the competitive convergence. Consequently, taking into account competitive interactions makes the results of the presented flight frequency programming model of an airline network practically useful in decision-making in airline network-planning under uncertain competitive conditions.
CONCLUSIONS
This study developed a model for determining optimal flight frequencies and airfares on airline network routes, which took into account competitive interactions. The model is comprised of three submodels, including an airline market share model, an airline flight frequency programming model, and a fuzzy-logic-based competitive interaction model. The airline market share model is formulated as functions of flight frequency shares and relative airline airfares on OD-pairs. The passenger demands and the airline market shares of all OD pairs are used as input parameters in the airline flight frequency programming model. Airlines' competitive interactions concerning route flight frequencies and airfares are also considered. The competitive interaction model, using Airline Flight Frequency Determination fuzzy logic tools, is developed to estimate competitors' reactions. An algorithm that combines all the three submodels is presented to solve this problem.
The developed models were applied to the CI network that serves ten selected cities, as a case study. The proposed market share model yielded a very good fit between the estimated models and historical data. The case study addressed three cases with different load factors, and competitive interaction results always converged. Moreover, the results of the proposed model are more accurate than those of the best-response model with the same dataset. The fuzzy-logicbased model was solved in much less time than the best-response game. The results of this case study were shown to be reasonable by comparing the obtained solutions with CI's actual market shares and route flight frequencies.
This study demonstrates how anticipated airline competitive interactions may be considered well in advance of solving airline flight frequency programming problems. The proposed models represent an analytical tool with which airlines can evaluate the impact of their strategies for adjusting flight frequencies and basic airfares in competitive environments. They are also useful devices for iteratively identifying competitive convergence. The proposed competitive interaction model can be extended to cover other issues in airline competition by reconstructing the fuzzy logic system of the model by undertaking further specific theoretical work or considering case studies. Actual airline practices and policies also can be integrated into the fuzzy logic system in future applications.
Consequently, the results of this study not only verify that an airline flight frequency programming model with the anticipated competitive interactions using fuzzy logic is practical, but also that it provides flexibility in the decision-making involved in airline network-planning in
